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Introduction
 Conspiratorial beliefs seem to be more and more 
widespread across the globe. Surveys conducted in 2006 
and 2011 showed that more than half of the population of 
US citizens believe in at least one conspiracy theory (Oliver 
& Wood, 2014). While belief in conspiracy theories is often 
seen as harmless, some beliefs have a bad impact on society 
(Douglas & Leite, 2017). The manipulation of facts about 
global warming or the harmful effects of vaccination may 
be examples (Jolley & Douglas, 2017; Wood, Douglas, & 
Sutton, 2012). Fear of negative effects of vaccination is an 
important factor influencing the incidence of infectious 
diseases among schoolchildren (Salmon et al., 2005), while 
theories on the origin and spread of HIV affect attitudes 
towards therapeutic and preventive programmes (Bogart & 
Thorburn, 2005). Also, conspiracist thinking makes people 
more likely to choose alternative therapies than biomedical 
ones (Lamberty & Imhoff, 2018). 
With all such potentially dangerous consequences 
of conspirational beliefs it is important that psychology 
conducts adequate research on them. To facilitate such 
research, appropriate tools are necessary. In this paper 
a tool of this kind is analyzed; more specifically, research 
on the Polish adaptation of the Generic Conspiracist Beliefs 
Scale (GCBS; Brotherton, French, &Pickering, 2013) is 
presented. To our knowledge, there is no standardized tool 
available for measuring conspiracist beliefs available for 
Polish psychologists, neither an adaptation nor an original 
one. The adaptation of GCBS may help to fill this gap, 
as certainly Polish society is not free from conspirational 
beliefs, to say the least (see for example: Bilewicz & 
Stefaniak, 2012; Czech, 2016; Kofta & Soral, 2018; 
Marchlewska, Łozowski, & Cichocka, 2019).
Believing in conspiracy theories, or conspiracist 
thinking, can be defined as a belief that observed events 
are a deliberate action of a certain conspiratorial group 
when there are other, much more likely, explanations 
(Aaronovitch, 2009; Van der Wal, Sutton, Lange, & Braga, 
2018). Moreover, at the origin of conspiracist thinking 
there is a projection mechanism, according to which people 
more often believe in conspiracy theories if they themselves 
would be willing to participate in a given conspiracy 
(Douglas & Sutton, 2011). 
People who believe in conspiracy theories are 
commonly attributed low intelligence or low tolerance for 
ambivalence and complexity of problems, while at the same 
time indicating a preference for simplified explanations 
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for complex problems (Swami, Voracek, Stieger, Tran, & 
Furnham, 2014). However, research results contradict this 
association (Abalakina-Paap, Stephan, Craig, & Gregory, 
1999). Believing in conspiracy theories is also linked to 
the fear of social exclusion (Graeupner & Coman, 2017; 
Lantian et al., 2018). However, many researchers simply 
assume (Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999; Bruder, Haffke, 
Neave, Nouripanah, & Imhoff, 2013; Galliford & Furnham, 
2017; Goertzel, 1994; Imhoff, & Bruder, 2014) that some 
people may have a general tendency to accept conspiracy 
theories. 
Measuring the Tendency to Believe 
in Conspiracy Theories
Pipes (1998) divided conspiracies into two categories: 
global and marginal ones. Global conspiracies are those 
that extend beyond the borders of individual countries 
and communities and are passed down from generation to 
generation. One of the most common topics of world-wide 
conspiracies are Jews and secret societies (Pipes, 1998), 
and they mainly concern plans to take control of the world. 
Marginal conspiracies, in turn, are those that arise in 
various communities. They are not as harmful as global 
conspiracies and are limited to local communities or 
individual countries (Pipes, 1998). 
Similarly, Moskovici (1987) distinguished between 
beliefs in particular conspiracy theories and a general 
tendency to conspiracist thinking. This also pointed to the 
need to find a tool to assess the tendency to conspiracist 
thinking without referring to specific events, which are 
the basis for popular and more widely known conspiracy 
theories. The lack of references to individual events, 
and thus to a specific cultural context, makes it possible 
to use such a tool in a wider demographic range. This 
makes it possible to include people from different cultural 
backgrounds or generations in the research. In line with 
this, GCBS (Brotherton et al., 2013) and the Conspiracy 
Mentality Questionnaire (Bruder et al., 2013) were 
designed to assess the degree of conspiracist thinking and 
belief in conspiracy theories without referring to single, 
well-known conspiracy theories. 
In this paper one tool for measuring the tendency to 
believe in conspiracy theories will be presented, namely, 
the Generic Conspiracist Beliefs Scale (GCBS; Brotherton 
et al., 2013) The aim of the presented research is to assess 
the psychometric properties of its Polish version.
Original Version of the Generic Conspiracist 
Beliefs Scale
T he aim of the GCBS (Brotherton et al., 2013) was to 
study the generalized tendencies to believe in conspiracy 
theories without referring to a specific theory, which 
would allow research at any historical moment and to 
eliminate the effect of cultural differences. Most of the 
tools used so far have tested the intensity of belief in 
conspiracy theories in relation to a particular conspiracy 
and, consequently, had a large number of limitations in 
their use (Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999; Goertzel, 1994; 
Swami et al., 2013). According to the authors of the original 
version of the GCBS, the limitations of tools to measure the 
degree of belief in conspiracy theories concern in particular 
cultural differences; in one country a given conspiracy 
theory may even be completely unknown to the public, 
which reduces the utility value of a given tool. Another 
limitation in the use of tools assuming measurement based 
on specific conspiracy theories seems to be a need for their 
constant updating, as other conspiracy theories become 
more popular and accessible to a wider audience over time 
(Brotherton et al., 2013). 
Originally Brotherton et al. (2013) developed 
a 75-item scale, on the basis of a review of scientific 
litera ture and popular literature concerning many existing 
conspiracy theories. The format of the answers assumed 
that the subjects (N = 489) would respond on a five-point 
Likert-like scale (1: I strongly disagree; 2: probably 
not true; 3: I am not sure / cannot decide; 4: probably 
true; 5: definitely true). Next, the authors carried out an 
exploratory factor analysis on this version of the scale. This 
allowed conspiracy theories to be divided into five general 
categories, such as: hiding contacts with extraterrestrial 
civilizations, activities detrimental to population health, 
information control, secret control groups and criminal 
activities of governmental organizations (Galliford & 
Furnham, 2017; Goertzel, 1994; Wood et al., 2012). 
On the basis of this long version, the authors eventually 
constructed a 15-item GCBS, which, while retaining all 
the advantages of the extended version, gained one more 
positive feature – it became more concise and easier to use. 
In subsequent studies, the authors checked the reliability 
and criterion validity on a sample of British university 
students (N = 235). The reliability analysis showed that 
the Cronbach alpha for the total score was very high 
(α = .93). The test-retest stability of the tool was tested on 
a sample of students (N = 42) at a five-week time interval. 
The correlation obtained by the authors was positive and 
strong (r = .89), which proved very good absolute stability 
of the tool. The criterion validity was confirmed by high 
positive correlations of the results obtained using GCBS 
with the results gained with other tools aimed at measuring 
conspiracist thinking. The results obtained by the authors 
of the original tool allow us to conclude that the level of 
criterion validity is satisfactory. 
Based on a series of factor analyses, Brotherton 
et al. (2013) identified the same five factors in the short 
version of the GCBS as in the long one: Government 
malfeasance (allegations of routine criminal conspiracy 
within governments), Malevolent global conspiracies 
(allegations that small, secret groups exert total control 
over global events), Extraterrestrial cover-up (deception 
of the public about the existence of aliens), Personal 
well-being (conspiracist concerns over personal health 
and liberty such as the spread of diseases or the use of 
mind-control technology), and Control of information 
(unethical control and suppression of information by 
organizations including the government, the media, 
scientists, and corporations). Computing a general 
score is also possible and recommended by Brotherton 
et al. (2013). 
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In their research, the authors also analyzed the 
theoretical validity of the results by correlating the results 
obtained with GCBS and other psychological tools that 
measure the features that may be related to the degree of 
belief in conspiracy theories among the examined persons. 
A 3-item tool, previously used by Goertzl (1994) in 
conspiracy-thinking research, was used to measure trust. 
The authors expected a negative correlation between 
trust and conspiracist thinking, which was demonstrated 
in the studies (r = –.34). Another correlate of conspiracist 
thinking used by the authors was anomy, which was 
measured using a 3-item scale also used in earlier Goertzel 
(1994) studies. In this case, a positive correlation between 
anomy and conspiracist thinking was expected, which 
was also confirmed by the authors of the original version 
of the tool (r = .42). To measure the correlation between 
conspiracist thinking and personality traits, a 50-item 
IPIP (International Personality Item Pool) questionnaire 
(Goldberg, 1999) was used to measure personality from 
the Big Five perspective. The correlation obtained by the 
authors of the original GCBS version with IPIP showed 
only a weak negative correlation with agreeableness 
(r = –.16). All the above results allow us to conclude that 
the tool by Brotherton et al. (2013) is valid and reliable, and 
therefore can be effectively used to measure the degree of 
conspiracist thinking.
Planned Analyses
In the present research, following analyses will be 
presented, concerning the Polish version of the GCBS. 
After descriptive results, the five-factor structure suggested 
by Brotherton et al. (2013) will be analyzed by means of 
a confirmatory factor analysis. Next, results concerning 
the internal consistency and test-retest stability will be 
presented. Three kinds of analyses concerning validity will 
follow. 
The first analysis, most closely resembling criterion 
validity, consisted in correlating the results from the 
GCBS scale with the paranoia subscale from the MMPI-2 
Inventory (Butcher, Graham, Ben-Porath, Tellegen, & 
Dahlstrom, 1989), which measures psychotic behavior and 
irrational thinking. A study conducted by Grzesiak-Feldman 
& Ejsmont (2008) showed a positive relationship between 
paranoia and conspiracist thinking. These results are 
consistent with expectations based on Groh’s (1987) thesis 
that conspiracist thinking is linked to a paranoid perception 
of social reality and intergroup relations. While adapting 
the tool, it was also expected to achieve positive correlation 
between conspiracist thinking and paranoia. 
Second, correlations of results on the GCBS scale with 
some measures believed to be related with conspiracist 
beliefs were calculated. Namely, it was expected that 
conspiracist beliefs should be positively related to 
openness to experience, as they seem to be an extreme 
form of openness. Such results were already mentioned in 
the literature: Swami, Chamorro-Premuzic, and Furnham 
(2010) showed a positive relationship between conspiracist 
thinking and openness to experience. Conspiracist 
thinking also correlated negatively with agreeableness 
(Goreis & Voracek, 2019), an effect probably due to 
suspicion and hostility observed among persons with high 
belief in conspiracy theories. Similar results were hence 
expected in these studies. Next, based on previous reports 
(Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999), negative correlation between 
self-esteem and conspiracist thinking was expected. Such 
relationship seems probable because belief in conspiracy 
theories allows people with low self-esteem to blame others 
for their possible failures (Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999). 
Also, the sense of lack of control (external locus of control) 
should increase the acceptance of conspiracy theories as 
a compensatory mechanism for the need of cognitive order 
in the environment (Hamsher, Geller, & Rotter, 1968). 
Finally, a positive correlation between the results obtained 
on the Scale of Belief in Zero-Sum Game and conspiracist 
thinking was expected, as – based on the results obtained 
in previous studies (Goertzl, 1994) – the level of anomy 
is positively correlated with conspiracist thinking, while 
anomy, anxiety and uncertainty are determinants of the 
understanding of life as a zero-sum game (Różycka & 
Wojciszke, 2010). 
The third analysis of validity consisted in a compari-
son of results on GCBS between persons with diagnosed 
paranoid schizophrenia or paranoid personality disorder and 
healthy participants. It was expected that the clinical group 
would have a significantly higher score than the healthy 
group, because suspicion is one of the axial symptoms 
of paranoid personality disorder, as well as delusions of 
paranoid schizophrenia are (WHO, 1992).
Method
Participants
The adaptation was carried out on a sample of 580 
persons, 387 women and 193 men (M = 26.77; SD = 9.23, 
aged 13 to 72). The tests were conducted on six samples, 
including one clinical sample (n = 22; see Table 1). 
The sample also included a group of 88 persons who 
participated in the verification of the absolute stability of 
the scale in a time interval of four weeks. The participants 
were split into several samples. The main reason for doing 
the research on several samples instead of one was the fact 
that there were many questionnaires applied and it would be 
difficult to have each person filling all of them. The main 
tool – the GCBS – was administered in all samples and 
the psychometric analyses concerning GCBS were done 
on all participants (apart from the clinical one). We realize 
that the samples differed somewhat. On the other hand, 
having a total sample as diverse as possible has also its 
obvious advantages. The differences between groups 
as regards the results on the GCBS were not significant 
(F(4, 553) = 1.08; p = .336), as was the correlation with age 
(r = .01, p = .907).
The basic characteristics of all samples and the 
tools administered in them are presented in Table 1. 
Sample 1 and 2 were recruited from various groups on 
social networks referring to conspiracy theories, faith in 
paranormal phenomena, and alternative medicine. Sample 
3 consisted of students of the Faculty of Philosophy of 
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the Jagiellonian University (Psychology, Philosophy, 
Sociology, Comparative Studies of Civilizations) and 
Computer Science at the AGH University of Science and 
Technology. Moreover, the respondents were also health 
care representatives and companies such as: Mitsubishi 
Electric, Uber, Saber, Comarch. Sample 4 consisted mainly 
of school youth in the first grades of junior high school, 
their parents and some school employees, the research 
was carried out at school with the consent of the school 
management and parents of children. 
Sample 5, in which the participants performed the 
test twice, consisted of student volunteers of the first year 
of Psychology from Jagiellonian University. Participants 
from the clinical group (Sample 6) were predominantly 
diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia and they were 
usually outpatients. Data from the clinical group were 
collected in several mental health centers in Lesser 
Poland.
Materials and Procedure
Polish version of the GCBS was translated into 
Polish and back-translated by an independent translator. 
The back-translated version was presented to the author 
of the original version and received his approval. Polish 
version of the scale is presented in Appendix. 
The version administered to the participants was 
entitled “The Scale of General Beliefs About the World”, 
in order to conceal its real purpose. The participants filled 
in tools on their own, in a random order, in a configuration 
depending on the sample (see Table 1). The study was most 
often conducted in groups of several persons (except for the 
clinical group, which was of an individual character), with 
no time limit.
Following tools were used, apart from the GCBS:
1. Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (SES; Rosenberg, 1965; 
Polish adaptation: Łaguna, Lachowicz-Tabaczek, & 
Dzwonkowska, 2007). This tool is one-dimensional 
and consists of 10 items to which the subjects respond 
on a four-point Likert-like scale. One of the items of 
this scale is “I am able to do things as well as, most 
other people”. Internal consistency of this scale in the 
present research was .90.
2. Locus of Control Scale (I-E). The tool was con-
structed by Rotter (1966) and translated into Polish 
by Karyłowski (1998; see: Terelak, Krzesicka, 
& Małkiewicz, 2009). It consists of 29 pairs of 
statements, 23 of which are diagnostic, constructed 
so that one relates to the external and the other to the 
internal locus of the control. An exemplary test item 
from the above scale is “One of the major reasons why 
we have wars is because people don’t take enough 
interest in politics. / There will be wars, no matter 
how hard people try to prevent them.”. Cronbach 
alpha from th e present research was unavailable; in 
a meta-analysis carried out by Ng, Sorensen, and 
Eby (2006) Cronbach’s alpha factor of this scale 
was .70. 
3. NEO-FFI Personality Inventory (Costa & McCrae, 
1978; Polish adaptation: Zawadzki, Strelau, Szczepa-
niak, & Śliwińska, 1998), which was used to measure 
neuroticism, extraversion, openness to experience, 
agreeableness and conscientiousness. Items from 
each scale of this inventory are: “N-“Sometimes feel 
completely worthless”; E-“Like to have lots of people 
around me”; O-“Intrigued by patterns I find in art 
and nature”; A-“Try to give help to anyone in need”; 
C-“Work hard to accomplish my goals”. Cronbach 
alphas of this inventory in the present research 
for the five factors were: N: .90; E: .81; O: .71; 
A: .82; C: .88.
4. Paranoia scale (40 items) from the MMPI–2 
Inventory (Butcher et al., 1989; Polish adaptation: 
Kuchar ski & Gomuła, 1998), which measures psy-
chotic behaviour, irrational thinking, suspiciousness, 
hostility, and interpersonal sensitivity. Items are 
answered as “Yes” or “No”, e.g. “There are persons 
who are trying to steal my thoughts and ideas”. 
The internal consistency in this research was .73. 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the samples tested
Sample No Tools N nf nm
Average 
age Age SD Age range
Sample 1 GCBS, SES, 0 Game, Paranoia, NEO-FFI 195 135  60 29.28  9.43 15–67
Sample 2 GCBS, I/E  88  60  28 32.22  1.84 19–72
Sample 3 GCBS, Paranoia 120  67  53 26.36  6.99 15–52
Sample 4 GCBS  67  45  22 16.88  3.96 13–30
Sample 5 – Retest sample GCBS, Paranoia  88  72  16 21.47  1.93 20–31
Sample 6 – clinical GCBS  22   8  14 36.27 14.08 20–72
Total 580 387 193
GCBS – Generic Conspiracist Beliefs Scale;  SES – Self-Esteem Scale;  0 Game – Scale of Belief in Zero-Sum Game; 
Paranoia – scale of Paranoia in MMPI 2;  NEO-FFI – Personality Inventory.
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5. Scale of Belief in Zero-Sum Game (Różycka & 
Wojciszke, 2010) tests whether people tend to think 
that they can only gain something at the expense of 
another person and that the interests of most people 
are in conflict with each other. It consists of 12 items 
answered on a 7-point Likert-like scale, e.g. “One 
loses so that one other can gain, that’s life”. Cronbach 
alpha in the present research was .83.
Results
Descriptive Statistics
We start by presenting the means and standard 
deviations on the results of the GCBS: on items, five 
factors identified in the original version, and the overall 
score, including gender differences (Table 2). To allow for 
easy comparability, we expressed the results on items and 
Table 2. Means, SDs on the items, subscales, and total score of the Generic Conspiracist Beliefs Scale
Item / Subscale / Total score Women Men Total
 1. The government is involved in the murder of innocent citizens and/or 
well-known public figures, and keeps this a secret 2.72 1.18 2.85 1.22 2.76 1.20
 2. The power held by heads of state is second to that of small unknown 
groups who really control world politics 3.02 1.27 3.18 1.24 3.07 1.26
 3. Secret organizations communicate with extraterrestrials, but keep this 
fact from the public 1.61 1.00 1.75 1.10 1.66 1.04
 4. The spread of certain viruses and/or diseases is the result of the 
deliberate, concealed efforts of some organization 2.64 1.24 2.69 1.29 2.66 1.26
 5. Groups of scientists manipulate, fabricate, or suppress evidence in order 
to deceive the public 3.11 1.27 3.03 1.33 3.08 1.29
 6. The government permits or perpetrates acts of terrorism on its own soil, 
disguising its involvement * 2.88 1.23 3.11 1.24 2.95 1.24
 7. A small, secret group of people is responsible for making all major 
world decisions, such as going to war 2.43 1.24 2.34 1.18 2.40 1.22
 8. Evidence of alien contact is being concealed from the public 2.08 1.25 2.16 1.25 2.10 1.25
 9. Technology with mind-control capacities is used on people without 
their knowledge 2.51 1.35 2.44 1.33 2.49 1.34
10. New and advanced technology which would harm current industry is 
being suppressed * 3.08 1.30 3.36 1.23 3.17 1.28
11. The government uses people as patsies to hide its involvement in 
criminal activity * 2.99 1.19 3.26 1.14 3.08 1.18
12. Certain significant events have been the result of the activity of a small 
group who secretly manipulate world events 2.66 1.22 2.60 1.34 2.64 1.26
13. Some UFO sightings and rumors are planned or staged in order to 
distract the public from real alien contact 2.01 1.20 2.03 1.21 2.01 1.20
14. Experiments involving new drugs or technologies are routinely carried 
out on the public without their knowledge or consent 2.88 1.30 2.92 1.27 2.90 1.29
15. A lot of important information is deliberately concealed from the public 
out of self-interest * 3.78 1.14 4.03 1.00 3.86 1.10
Government malfeasance * 2.86 1.00 3.07 1.03 2.93 1.01
Malevolent global conspiracies 2.70 1.11 2.71 1.08 2.70 1.10
Extraterrestrial cover up 1.90 1.03 1.98 1.09 1.93 1.05
Personal wellbeing 2.68 1.10 2.68 1.09 2.68 1.10
Control of information 3.32  .98 3.47  .93 3.37  .97
Total score 2.69 (.87) 2,78 (.87) 2,72 (.87)
Positions marked with and asterisk differ significantly between women and men based on Student t tests.
264 Adam Siwiak, Malwina Szpitalak, Romuald Polczyk
subscales, as well as the total score, as means. These and 
following analyses were performed on combined samples 
1, 2, 3, 4 and 5, that is, on healthy adults.
The items most often endorsed were “15. A lot of 
important information is deliberately concealed from 
the public out of self-interest”, “10. New and advanced 
technology which would harm current industry is being 
suppressed”, “5. Groups of scientists manipulate, fabricate, 
or suppress evidence in order to deceive the public”, and 
“11. The government uses people as patsies to hide its 
involvement in criminal activity”. It seems then that in 
the Polish society most widespread conspiracist beliefs 
tend to concern hiding of important information. In 
contrast, statements “8. Evidence of alien contact is being 
concealed from the public”, “13. Some UFO sightings 
and rumors are planned or staged in order to distract the 
public from real alien contact”, and especially “3. Secret 
organizations communicate with extraterrestrials but 
keep this fact from the public” had lowest means in this 
research, which means that the Polish participants do 
not believe much in aliens. On the level of subscales, 
the most believed one was “Control of information”, 
and the least endorsed: “Extraterrestrial cover up”. 
Not many gender differences were detected; as for 
subscales, men more than women believed in government 
malfeasance.
Fact or Structure and Reliability
Although the authors of the original version of the 
GCBS finally recommend using the general score, they 
nevertheless found important factors and confirmed 
them in confirmatory factor analysis, as well they used 
the factors in their analyses (Brotherton et al., 2013). 
Therefore, confirmatory factor analysis was performed on 
our results as well. Following analyses were performed: 
(1) a model assuming one general factor; (2) a five-factor 
model in which the factors were allowed to correlate; 
(3) a five-factor model assuming uncorrelated factors. 
Also, the fit of the first three models was compared, using 
the chi-square based significance test for differences 
among nested models. Confirmatory factor analyses and 
comparisons were done with the lavaan software (Rosseel, 
2012) running under the R Environment (R Core Team, 
2016). The results are presented in Table 3. 
As can be seen in Table 1, the five-factor model 
assuming correlated factors had by far the best fit, and 
one acceptable by most conventional criteria (e.g. Hu & 
Bentler, 1999). The remaining models had a much worse 
fit. Comparisons done by means of the chi-square tests 
indicated that the first model was significantly worse 
than the second one (chi2 diff = 689.36, p < .001) and the 
second one was better than the third one (chi2 diff = 1583.90, 
p < .001). Therefore, the five-factor model allowing for 
intercorrelations among factors was adopted and used 
in subsequent analyses. However, the general score was 
analyzed as well. 
Reliability statistics are given in Table 4. As can 
be seen, the reliability of the total score calculated as 
Cronbach alpha was excellent. The subscales had high 
internal consistency as well, which is satisfactory given 
that each of them only comprised three items. Four-week 
test-retest stability was also high.
The intercorrelations among subscales were all 
significant and ranged from .43 (between Extraterrestrial 
cover up and Control of information) to .74 (between 
Malevolent global conspiracies and Personal wellbeing).
Table 4. Reliability of the general scores and subscales
Subscale / Total score Cronbach alpha
Test-retest
4 weeks 
(n = 88)
Government malfeasance .79 .80
Malevolent global 
conspiracies
.85 .77
Extraterrestrial cover up .88 .87
Personal wellbeing .80 .79
Control of information .70 .77
Total score .93 .90
Validity
Results of correlational analyses concerning construct 
validity are presented in Table 5. 
In accordance with expectations, conspiracist beliefs 
were positively related to paranoid tendencies, however, 
only in the case of two subscales (Government malfeasance 
and Malevolent global conspiracies). The total score was 
also significantly related to paranoia, but this correlation 
was weak (r = .16). Also, as expected, agreeableness was 
negatively related to conspiracist beliefs: in the case of 
the total score, and Government malfeasance, Malevolent 
Table 3. Goodness-of-fit indexes for three factorial models
Model CFI TLI SRMR RMSEA L 90% CI H 90% CI
1. General factor .82 .79 .07 .13 .12 .14
2. 5-factor correlated .97 .96 .04 .06 .05 .07
3. 5-factor orthogonal .64 .57 .39 .19 .18 .19
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global conspiracies and Control of information subscales. 
However, no significant correlations were found for 
openness to experience (and neuroticism, extraversion, and 
consciousness). The correlation of the total score on the 
GCBS (and Government malfeasance) with self-esteem 
were significant, but positive, contrary to expectations. 
Finally, all subscales and the total score on the GCBS 
showed the expected positive correlation with believing 
in life as a zero-sum game. In sum, correlational analyses 
provided some support for the validity of GCBS, but not 
a strong one.
Finally, results comparing persons with diagnosed 
paranoid schizophrenia or paranoid personality disorder with 
healthy controls are presented in Table 6. The control group 
was constructed by means of matching age and gender.
The results were clear-cut: the clinical sample 
consisting of persons with diagnosed paranoid schizo-
phrenia or paranoid personality scored higher on all 
subscales and the general score on the GCBS scale, and the 
effect sizes (eta-squared) were quite sizeable. This confirms 
the validity of this tool.
General Discussion
The results of the study showed that GCBS is a tool 
that had high internal reliability and test-retest stability. 
No substantial gender differences were found, in line with 
other analyses of this kind (Freeman & Bentall, 2017; 
Van Prooijen, 2017); the correation with age was also not 
significant.
On the whole, the results pertaining to means, factor 
structure, and reliabilities were very comparable to those 
concerning the original version of the scale. The mean 
results on the Polish version of GCBS was 2.69, and in 
the original version: 2.61. Both versions showed a similar 
and good fit as regards the factor structure. Also, internal 
consistency was very similar; for the total score, the 
original and adapted version had identical Cronbach 
alpha: .93.
Conspiracist thinking measured with the Polish 
version of GCBS correlated with some factors that, judging 
from theoretical grounds, could be related to conspiracist 
thinking. The results obtained on the Paranoia scale of the 
MMPI-2 Inventory and the Scale of Belief in Zero-Sum 
Table 5. Results of correlation analyses between the GCBS subscales and the total score, and paranoia, 
personality, self-esteem, locus of control, and believing in zero-sum games Pearson r
 
Government
malfeasance
Malevolent 
global 
conspiracies
Extraterrestrial 
cover up
Personal 
wellbeing
Control 
of information
Total 
score
Paranoia .22** .20** .07 .10 .05 .16*
Neuroticism .14 .10 .05 .07 .06 .10
Extraversion –.01 .03 .09 .05 .03 .04
Openness to experience –.04 –.08 –.04 –.09 –.09 –.08
Agreeableness –.24** –.18* –.11 –.13 –.14* –.19**
Conscientiousness –.11 –.03 –.08 –.06 –.14 –.10
Self-esteem .25** .12 .11 .14 .17* .18*
External Locus of control .33** .20 .27* .22* .22* .30**
Beliefs in zero-sum game .29** .22** .21** .27** .25** .29**
*  p < .05;  **  p < .01.
Table 6. Comparison of the clinical (paranoid schizophrenia/paranoid personality) and healthy samples – means 
(SDs) and results of t tests for differences
Clinical
(n = 22)
Healthy
(n = 22) t(42) η
2 p
Government malfeasance 4.02 (.65) 2.42 (.92) 6.60 .51 < .001
Malevolent global conspiracies 3.55 (.90) 2.23 (.92) 4.80 .35 < .001
Extraterrestrial cover up 3.20 (.74) 1.76 (.97) 5.53 .42 < .001
Personal wellbeing 3.70 (.80) 2.29 (1.02) 5.11 .38 < .001
Control of information 3.97 (.50) 3.03 (.88) 4.33 .31 < .001
Total score 3.68 (.57) 2.35 (.81) 6.33 .49 < .001
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Game were in line with expectations – they showed 
positive correlation dependencies, but, as for paranoia, the 
correlation was rather low. High scores on the Paranoia 
MMPI-2 scale may indicate that the respondents have 
a tendency for conspiracist thinking with regard to the 
representatives of other nationalities, as demonstrated 
earlier in the study by Grzesiak-Feldman & Ejsmont 
(2008). In addition, high scores on the Paranoia scale may 
indicate moral and ethical inflexibility of the respondents, 
which is also linked to belief in conspiracy theories (Van 
Prooijen & Jostmann, 2013). Results of the previous studies 
(Drinkwater, Dagnall, & Parker, 2012), also pointed to 
similarities between conspiracist thinking and paranoia, 
in which it is possible to logically argue for, and defend 
delusional beliefs, superstitions and beliefs in supernatural 
phenomena. Van Proojen, Douglas, & Inocencio (2018) 
stated that belief in conspiracy theories and supernatural 
phenomena results from an illusory pattern of perception. 
They believe that the illusory perception of patterns is the 
main mechanism that is responsible for both conspiracy and 
supernatural beliefs.
What combines the results of the MMPI-2 Inventory 
and the Scale of Belief in Zero-Sum Game with 
conspiracist thinking is mistrust towards the rest of the 
population (Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999). This mistrust 
gives rise to fear, which in a zero-sum game situation is 
the cause of realization of the limitation of resources in the 
population and, consequently, of the need to fight for these 
resources. 
As for believing in life as a zero-sum game a caveat 
is however needed. Although the results were clear-cut, 
the justification of the hypothesis abou t the relationship 
between conspiracist beliefs and believing in zero-sum 
game has its weakness. It was postulated that anomie 
correlates with conspiracy belief and also correlates with 
a zero-sum understanding of life. A sort of mediation is 
assumed here, not testable in the present research.
Interestingly, self-esteem proved to be positively 
correlated with conspiracist thinking, while the results of 
studies presented by Abalakina-Paap et al. (1999) showed 
a negative correlation of these two traits. A possible 
explanation for the positive relationship between self-
-esteem and a tendency to conspiracist thinking in this 
study is that people with high self-esteem are less critical 
of the information they receive (Góralewska-Słońska, 2011; 
Reykowski, 1992), which is also typical for persons with 
a strong belief in conspiracy theories. 
Conspiracist thinking correlated positively with 
external locus of control, which was expected and 
consistent with the results obtained by other researchers 
(Hamsher, Geller, & Rotter, 1968). Individuals with an 
elevated level of manifestation of a sense of control seek 
the causes of surrounding phenomena in people or events 
that lie beyond their control, resulting in an increased belief 
in conspiracy theories (Hamsher et al., 1968). 
Results of previous studies using personality research 
tools within the Big Five have shown a negative relation-
ship between conspiracist thinking and agreeableness (Goreis 
& Voracek, 2019) and a positive relationship with openness 
to experience (Swami et al., 2010). In the present research, 
a significant negative correlation of conspiracist thinking 
concerned only the scale of agreeableness. This was expected 
and consistent with previous studies (Goreis & Voracek, 
2019). In a study conducted by Galliford & Furnham (2017), 
agreeableness was negatively correlated only with political 
conspiracy theories – not medical theories. 
Limitations and Future Directions
First of all, the validity of the GCBS remains still 
to be demonstrated more convincingly, as some of the 
relevant effects in the present analyses were weak, and one 
was even reverse to the expected (the positive correlation 
of self-esteem with conspiracist beliefs). One important 
validity analysis is missing in the present study, namely, 
direct criterion validity. However, we were not aware of any 
other already existing tool in Polish language measuring 
conspiracist beliefs. Such an analysis remains an important 
topic for future research. To some extent however, the 
correlations of GCBS with the paranoia scale from the 
MMPI-2 Inventory confirms its criterion validity.
Also, measurement invariance has to be proven 
between the Polish adaptation and the original version 
of the scale, and also perhaps between men and women. 
Moreover, more research on various populations is needed. 
The main sample was recruited, among others, on social 
networks referring to conspiracy theories which means the 
participants may have been biased.
Another limitation of the present study may be 
the way in which we recruited samples: they were quite 
heterogeneous, and it is possible that the psychometric 
and correlational analyses would yield somewhat different 
results had all participants be administered all tools. This 
however was difficult given the number of tools. Expanding 
the research populations remais an important task, so that 
the findings can be generalized to broader populations. 
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Appendix
Ogólna Skala Wierzeń Konspiracyjnych
Przekonania na temat świata.
Często rozważa się czy opinia publiczna jest poinformowana o całej prawdzie na temat różnych istotnych problemów. 
Ta krótka ankieta została zaprojektowana w celu oszacowania Pana/i przekonań na temat niektórych z tych problemów.
Proszę aby Pan/i określił/a prawdziwość poniższych stwierdzeń za pomocą następującej skali:
1. Zdecydowanie nieprawdziwe.
2. Prawdopodobnie nieprawdziwe.
3. Nie mam pewności/nie mogę zdecydować.
4. Prawdopodobnie prawdziwe.
5. Zdecydowanie prawdziwe.
1. Rząd w sekrecie jest zamieszany w morderstwa niewinnych obywateli lub znanych osób publicznych.
 1 2 3 4 5
2. Ponad przywódca mi państw istnieją nieliczne, niejawne grupy utrzymujące prawdziwą kontrolę nad polityką światową.
 1 2 3 4 5
3. Tajne organizacje komunikują się z istotami pozaziemskimi w sekrecie przed społeczeństwem.
 1 2 3 4 5
4. Pewne wirusy lub choroby rozprzestrzeniane są w efekcie rozmyślnego, ukrytego działania pewnych organizacji.
 1 2 3 4 5
5. Grupy naukowców manipulują, preparują lub ukrywają fakty, by zwieść społeczeństwo.
 1 2 3 4 5
6. Rząd umożliwia lub popełnia akty terroru na własnym terytorium, ukrywając swój udział.
 1 2 3 4 5
7. Niewielka, tajna grupa jest odpowiedzialna za wszystkie znaczące światowe decyzje, takie jak wypowiedzenie wojny.
 1 2 3 4 5
8. Dowody na kontakt z obcą cywilizacją jest ukrywany przed społeczeństwem.
 1 2 3 4 5
9. Technologia umożliwiająca kontrolę umysłu jest stosowana na ludziach, bez ich wiedzy.
 1 2 3 4 5
10. Nowe, zaawansowane technologie są blokowane, żeby nie zaszkodzić istniejącemu przemysłowi.
 1 2 3 4 5
11. Rząd ukrywa swoją aktywność przestępczą przedstawiając ludzi w roli kozła ofiarnego.
 1 2 3 4 5
12. Pewne znaczące wydarzenia były efektem działania niewielkiej grupy, która w sekrecie manipuluje wydarzeniami na świecie.
 1 2 3 4 5
13. Pewne obserwacje lub pogłoski na temat UFO są pozorowane, w celu odwrócenia uwagi społeczeństwa od prawdziwego kontaktu 
z obcą cywilizacją.
 1 2 3 4 5
14. Powszechnie przeprowadza się eksperymenty z wykorzystaniem nowych technologii lub substancji chemicznych na nieświadomym 
społeczeństwie
 1 2 3 4 5
15. Pewne osoby celowo ukrywają przed społeczeństwem wiele znaczących informacji, by odnieść osobiste korzyści.
 1 2 3 4 5
